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Extended Commentary: 
Military Service without the Common Rule 
 
 Madison Powers, a senior research scholar at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and a 
professor of philosophy at Georgetown, wrote that “Reliance on individual consent alone is not 
adequate to protect persons from exploitation under conditions of grossly unequal bargaining 
power, information, and human need.”1 According to such reasoning, and as a conscionable 
reaction to medical research atrocities such as those of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the 
Nuremberg Trials, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
developed the US Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, also known as the 
“Common Rule” (45 CFR 46) to throttle researches involving those most vulnerable to 
exploitation. Subparts of the Common Rule prescribe protections for pregnant women, human 
fetuses, neonates, prisoners and children.2 The Common Rule does not mention military service 
members, and hence does not protect them as a vulnerable class of people. Other laws offer 
protection in relations to clinical research on U.S. military service members, but they are far 
from the straightforward protections offered by the Common Rule. 21 CFR Parts 50 and 312, 
which govern the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, states: “Under the Defense 
Authorization Act, the President is authorized to waive the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act's…informed consent requirements in military operations if the President finds that obtaining 
consent is infeasible or contrary to the best interests of recipients and on an additional ground 
that obtaining consent is contrary to national security interests.” 3 As military member’s 
employer, the Department of Defense (DOD) forces service members to continue their voluntary 
service under threat of legal penalty, dictates much of the living arrangements of service 
members (such as whether a service member lives in Hawaii or Iraq or on a ship) and —this is a 
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key component— provides healthcare to the service member, may legally request that the 
president override a service member’s wish to receive or not to receive experimental medicines. 
There is great practicality to the waiving of a service member’s right to refuse medical 
care, but there is also great risk in dismissing the importance of this step. This risk is what makes 
service members—and especially junior enlisted service members—a class of individuals 
vulnerable to research exploitation and warrants consideration for their protection under the 
Common Rule. For example, in 1802 a French army invaded Haiti to restore French authority 
over the island and bolster French forces in the New World. Before the worst of the fighting 
began, an enormous portion of the French army was hospitalized with yellow fever. As a result 
the French lost control of Haiti and Napoleon cut his losses by selling the Louisiana Territory to 
the United States in 1803. If a useful immunization had then been available, Napoleon would 
have ordered his military physicians to prescribe the immunization to his soldiers so long as the 
number of soldiers expected to die from the immunization was tolerable. Had the French army 
been immunized, the Haitian forces would likely have been defeated and the history of the New 
World set on a much different course. A soldier who refused the immunization under these 
conditions would have been court-martialed and either discharged or forced to receive the 
immunization anyway—as receipt of this medicine was tactically essential to military 
achievement. Tactical necessity trumps individual rights in the military—such is the price of 
victory. 
Over the next century, yellow fever epidemics continued to flare up in the New World. 
Construction of the Panama Canal had to be abandoned because yellow fever was killing so 
many workers. Epidemics in Memphis, Philadelphia, and many other cities left thousands dead 
or crippled. In 1900 Dr. Walter Reed (for whom the Army Hospital in Maryland is named) was 
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charged by the US Surgeon General to find a solution to yellow fever epidemics. Dr. Reed 
formed the Yellow Fever Commission in Cuba and set to work. In one experiment, U.S. Army 
and local volunteers lived in confined areas for twenty days, and were exposed to either fomites 
(clothing and pellets of black vomit from other YF patients) or mosquitoes infected with yellow 
fever. Sixteen American service members, including John Kissinger—farm boy from Indiana— 
volunteered for such experiments in which the expected death rate was 20 to 40 percent.4  John 
Kissinger contracted yellow fever and was left paralyzed as a result of the experiments. He was 
awarded the Medal of Honor for his bravery. 
Although the nature of Dr. Reed’s authority over the men in his unit was subject to all 
applicable Army regulations and was legally restricted to his objective, Dr. Reed was still a 
commissioned officer (promoted to Major in 1893) on an Army base, and he was looking to 
recruit volunteers for dangerous experiments. Dr. Reed was also a physician acting as the 
primary investigator of his own clinical experiments. Even if Dr. Reed was capable of separating 
his medical authority (expertise) from his military authority (rank), the junior-enlisted soldiers 
could not have been expected to make the same distinction.  “Enlisted soldiers who were asked 
to participate in a potentially deadly experiment by their superior officers may have interpreted 
such requests as orders; vulnerable, poor newcomers recruited with tempting offers of $200 in 
gold coins for participation and bonuses if they contracted the malady (a sum many times more 
than their annual incomes) were not exactly giving their consent freely either.”5  Dr. Reed 
believed it was necessary to tolerate the deaths of three to six of the sixteen junior-enlisted 
volunteers. He was ethically obligated to accept volunteers only—and even provided translated 
consent forms to volunteers—but was it even possible for the young soldiers volunteers to give 
un-coerced, informed consent? Bernard Lo, MD notes that “Although informed consent is legally 
3
Garland: Extended Commentary: Military Service without the Common Rule
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, 2018
  
required, many physicians are skeptical because patients can never understand medical situations 
as well as doctors and because they can usually persuade patients to follow their 
recommendations.”6 The doctor’s ability to influence patients is potentially even greater in the 
relationship between a commissioned officer and a junior-enlisted soldier, sailor, marine, or 
airman. Dr. Reed and the rest of the Yellow Fever Commission demonstrated that the Aedes 
aegypti mosquito was the primary vector for yellow fever. Policies predicated upon this precious 
knowledge saved thousands of lives over the entire globe.7 
Some institutions recognize that technical expertise and military rank can be detrimental 
to the safety of subordinate subjects. For example, the University of Utah IRB stipulates that 
when conducting research involving DOD personnel “Officers are not permitted to influence the 
decision of their subordinates; Officers and senior non-commissioned officers may not be present 
at the time of recruitment; Officers and senior non-commissioned officers have a separate 
opportunity to participate and; When recruitment involves a percentage of a unit, an independent 
ombudsman is present.8 In today’s military, JAG officers, line officers, chaplains, and medical 
officers, wear the rank of commissioned officers (lieutenant, captain, major, etc.). For junior 
enlisted personnel, the distinguishing insignia of the officer’s specialty (a laurel wreath for a 
lawyer, an oak leaf for a physician, etc.) only tells them what the officer is specifically useful for 
and does not communicate a set of unique standards for distinguishing ethical and lawful orders 
from unlawful or unethical orders based on that officer’s insignia. Thus the junior enlisted 
personnel are vulnerable to exploitation by the system they are confined to and deserve a source 
of legal protection other than their employer—the Department of Defense. 
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Recent Military Clinical Trials 
Today, clinical trials in the United States are governed by institutional review boards 
(IRBs), whose conduct is officially regulated by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS). Ethical catastrophes demonstrate that an institution, no matter how large or small or well-
intentioned, is so essentially biased toward its own aims that an institution cannot be trusted to 
ethically guide itself and ought to have at least some ethical oversight from a disinterested entity, 
as can be seen in several cases.9 Medical catastrophes sometimes lead to the establishment and 
imposition of new ethical codes such as the Belmont Report (a parent of the Common Rule) and 
the Nuremberg Code, precisely because institutions cannot be trusted to govern their own ethical 
conduct and must be governed by a third party that can balance societal and individual risks and 
benefits.10   
Research on military personnel is governed in part by DoD Directive 3216.02 Protection 
of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research11 and DoD 
Directive 6200.2 Use of Investigational New Drugs for Force Health Protection.12 The former 
states: 
“Investigators, IRBs, Ios [Institutional Officials], and DoD Component 
personnel reviewing research protocols shall consider the need for appropriate 
similar safeguards for other vulnerable populations, such as: research involving 
human subjects and investigators in supervisor-subordinate relationships, 
human subjects with decisional or mental impairments, human subjects with a 
physical disability, or any other kind of human subjects in circumstances that 
may warrant provision of additional protections. As appropriate, qualified 
individuals (e.g., research monitors, ombudsmen, advocates) may be appointed 
to perform oversight functions or assist the human subjects.”13 
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When the subjects and investigators are all members of the DOD, regulation must come from an 
external source, not the DOD. The Department of Defense conducts a vast amount of research, 
so this is not something that can be casually governed. The DOD employs over three million 
people, and in 2017 alone had an annual research budget of $76.2 billion.14 The Human Research 
Office of the DOD supervises and publishes research on military personnel and third parties.15 
The US military also conducts one of the world’s largest research programs on biomedical 
enhancements.16 The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research regularly conducts research on 
comprehensive soldier fitness, brain injury, sleep deprivation, and works to develop vaccines and 
drugs for prevention and treatment for malaria, HIV/AIDS, dengue fever, wound infections, 
leishmaniosis, enteric diseases, and others. WRAIR includes an insectary for raising flies and 
mosquitoes, a bioproduction facility, resources for conducting clinical trials (both in the U.S. and 
abroad), and has a multidrug-resistant repository and surveillance network. Another branch of 
the DOD maintains a serum repository, replete with its own ethical concerns.17 DOD employees 
are protected by the DOD’s Common Rule provision (Title 32 CFR, Part 219, governs the 
Department of Defense and §219.101 Protection of Human Subjects, restates the Common Rule) 
and are not at any unusual risk of being exploited by their employer but military service 
members, and especially the largely uneducated junior-enlisted service members, are confined to 
service for the duration of their voluntary enlistment under 10 USC 86.886(2), (also known as 
UCMJ Article 86). Junior enlisted military service members employ such foreshortened 
bargaining power against the DOD that outside protections are essential. 
Dazzling discoveries shadowed by egregious conduct among military research is not new. 
The “blood bank,” for example, was developed in large part to help soldiers during the First 
World War,18 as were dozens of advancements in plastic surgery. Submarine technology led to 
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ultrasound machines. These accomplishments were accompanied by experiments with mustard 
gas, radiation, and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).19 Knowledge of early anti-malarial drugs 
and yellow fever vectors (as discussed above) were expensive facts that we largely owe to 
military research and researchers. A more detailed history of military research can be found in 
Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and Research.20 
Promising clinical trials can be fast-tracked in the military to get the technology to the 
front lines, and medical training can be expeditiously completed.  If a service member perceived 
a risk (either by informed consent or other means) and desired to refuse to perform the task (eat 
the food, sign a consent form, breathe the gas, etc.) the service member may pre-emptively 
consider it a violation of a lawful order, which is a unique quandary for clinical trials among 
military service members. If that service member did refuse the treatment, and the order was 
later judged to have been lawfully permissible, then the service member could face charges 
under the UCMJ. Even if a service member is informed of risks, they are never entirely free from 
reprisals for refusing to give consent, and it is therefore unconscionable to have the DOD 
regulate research on DOD employees. Supervision from the VA, for example, might improve 
continuity of care for junior enlisted service members after they finish their enlistments.  
Madison Powers, the professor of ethics whose words introduced this essay, went on to 
clarify that “Under such conditions of inequality, some persons will bear greater burdens and 
receive fewer benefits of social cooperation. Justice therefore demands more than mere 
noninterference with voluntary agreements. Some role for government or other intervening 
institution is needed to police such agreements and to protect against exploitation.”21 Soldiers 
represent a population made vulnerable by their subordination within a bureaucracy that, when 
absolutely necessary, prioritizes mission completion over employee health (again, such is the 
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nature of the military). Adapting the Common Rule to include protections of junior enlisted 
service members would not clarify the gray area between commissioned officer and medical 
provider but such an adaptation would limit the clinical risks to which junior enlisted personnel 
are exposed.  
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